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The Interconnection of Willing and 
Believing in Kant’s and Kantian Ethics 
 
 
In this paper I look at the connection between willing and believing and, in 
particular, the role that this connection has in Kant’s and Kantian ethics. I argue that the 
two main formulations of the categorical imperative are relativized to agents according to 
their beliefs, and I point out three different ways in which Kant or a present day Kantian 
might defend this. I conclude with some remarks about the contrast between Kant’s legal 
theory and his ethical theory.  
 
 
 
0 Introduction 
 
 Kant’s ethics traditionally has been characterized as an ethics of willing, an ethics 
of maxims, an ethics of intention. These characterizations are meant to distinguish it from 
traditional forms of consequentialism, which are ethics of action, ethics of consequences, 
ethics of results.i What often gets overlooked is the deep connection between willing and 
believing and the shape that this gives to Kant’s (and any plausibly Kantian) ethics.  
 One place where this connection can be seen is Kant’s argument for the practical 
postulates.ii Although Kant’s argument for the practical postulates changes in his various 
articulations of the doctrine of the highest good, the general scheme remains the same. 
Agents ought to promote the highest good as far as they are able. But agents cannot will 
something if they do not believe that the thing is really possible. That is, agents cannot 
will something unless they believe that it is not merely logically possible (i.e., free of 
internal contradiction) but also really possible (i.e., has a ground in actuality). The 
highest good is a real possibility only if God exists and agents are immortal. Therefore, 
agents, insofar as they are rational, ought to believe in God and in immortality. iii I take 
this to show that Kant was at some level aware that what one wills can influence what 
one believesiv and even that the moral law prescribes certain sorts of belief.v The idea is 
not that one should accept some proposition X in the face of persistent and indisputable 
evidence to the contrary because of what one values. Rather, the idea is that in cases of 
epistemic uncertainty,vi what one believes can and sometimes should be influenced by 
what one values. 
 The connection between willing and believing goes in both directions. Kant gives 
an example of this in his discussion of the Scottish rebels who attempted to put Prince 
Stuart in command of the British throne in 1745-1746. He argues that some of the 
Scottish rebels believed that this uprising was their duty to the House of Stuart (RL, AA 
06:333-334). The remainder of the passage indicates that Kant thinks that the Scottish 
rebels have mistaken honor for duty (honor is a mere simulacrum of duty). But the fact 
that the Scottish rebels believed that they had a duty to behave in a certain way led them 
to adopt certain maxims, perform certain actions, etc.vii More prosaic examples of the 
way in which belief can influence willing can be found by appeal to the ought implies can 
principle. If an agent believes that it is impossible to X, s/he probably will believe that 
s/he does not have a duty to X.  
 In this paper I am interested in the way beliefs can influence willing. I am interested 
in the way that an agent’s beliefs can determine what maxims s/he adopts. In particular, I 
argue that unless one denies the problem of moral knowledge (to be explained more fully 
below), different agents can reach different results applying the same formulations of the 
Categorical Imperative (CI) to the same situations. In other words: maxim + 
circumstances underdetermines the results of the tests proposed in the CI.  
 The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. First, I look at the 
Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and the Formula of Humanity (FH) in order to argue 
for my claim. Second, I give three different ways that Kant (and a present day Kantian) 
might deal with my claim (one of which is to deny the problem of moral knowledge). 
Finally, I conclude with some remarks about the difference between Kant’s doctrine of 
right and his doctrine of virtue. I also point out that, depending on which way of dealing 
with my claim is accepted, the standard reading of Kant’s ethics as an ethics of willing 
might be in need of some serious revision.  
 
1 The problem of false beliefs  
 
 I point out now that what I am calling the problem of false beliefs was not 
recognized explicitly by Kant as such. This gives rise to an exegetical dilemma, which I 
try to resolve by justifying this result in the next section in three different ways, all of 
which can be given a Kantian pedigree.  
 
1.1 FUL: Simple conformity or through your will  
 
In his derivation of FUL in part I of the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
argues as follows:  
 
Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it from obeying some law, 
nothing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law, which alone is to 
serve the will as its principle, that is, I ought never to act except in such a way that I also 
could will that my maxim should become a universal law.   (GMS, AA 04:402)  
 
There are two distinct principles articulated in this section of the text.viii The first is:  
 
  L: Conform your actions to universal law.  
 
The second is:  
 
FUL: Act in such a way that you could will that your maxim should 
become a universal law.  
 
The main difference between L and FUL has to do with willing: FUL introduces the idea 
that one should be able to will one’s maxim as a universal law. One’s maxim must be 
able to become a universal law through one’s will. This idea is not contained in L. L does 
not refer to what an agent can or cannot will; it simply tells an agent to conform his/her 
actions to universal law. L might be paraphrased as a claim about value. According to L, 
universal laws are unconditionally good in some sense. These two prescriptions come 
apart precisely because of the fact noted in the introduction: there is a connection 
between willing and believing. An example will make this clear.  
 Consider the maxim “to commit suicide from self-love when my prospects seem to 
afford more pain than pleasure.” I can will this maxim to be a universal law just in case 
the maxim can become a universal law of nature through my will. Now if I believe that 
the purpose of self-love is to further life, then this maxim presumably cannot become a 
universal law of nature through my will, for (on reflection) I shall notice that as a 
universal law of nature this law would involve a contradiction: I am using self-love in a 
way inconsistent with its natural purposiveness. But if I believe that the purpose of self-
love is to attain pleasure and to avoid pain, then this maxim can become a universal law 
of nature through my will. Thus, whether this maxim passes the test proposed in FUL 
(whether an agent can will that his/her maxim should become a universal law) will 
depend upon the agent’s beliefs. 
 Someone might argue that there are two notions of willing in Kant. This idea can 
get off the ground by analogy to the two notions of wanting often at play in Plato’s 
dialogues. Socrates sometimes argues with his interlocutors that they do not really want 
that. What they really want is this. For example, suppose that you believe that there is 
leftover Halloween candy in the lounge and you tell me, “I want to go into the lounge.” I 
happen to know why it is that you want to go into the lounge. I also know that the 
leftover Halloween candy has been moved from the lounge to the copy room. So I say, 
“you do not want to go to the lounge really. Really, you want to go to the copy room.”  
 There seem to be two senses of ‘want’ here, and probably there is a way in which 
both of us are correct. Just so, someone might argue that there are two senses of ‘will’ in 
play in Kant. There is what one rationally wills and what one wills (simpliciter). 
Continuing with the objection, the sense of ‘will’ at play in FUL is the former rather than 
the latter. Thus, FUL is independent of what an agent subjectively can will based on false 
beliefs. Thus (the objection concludes) my argument ((1) what agents can will depends 
on what they believe, (2) the results of FUL depend on what agents can will, therefore (3) 
the results of FUL depend on what agents can believe) rests on an equivocation.  
 But this objection rests on an incoherent interpretation of Kant. The whole point of 
FUL is that someone rationally can will maxim X if and only if maxim X can become a 
universal law through his/her will. The whole point of FUL is to make a bridge between 
normal willing and rational willing: FUL is the criterion of rational willing. So this 
objection would make FUL circular. 
 However, L is not relativized to the agent in this way. L contains no reference to 
what an agent can will, thus the fact that what an agent can will depends on what that 
agent believes does not come into play. Regardless of what an agent believes about the 
purposiveness of self-love, there is a fact of the matter with regard to whether the suicide 
maxim can be a universal law. There is, of course, a fact of the matter about whether any 
particular agent can will the suicide maxim as a universal law. But the point is that this 
fact will depend on the agent’s beliefs about the world. Thus, FUL and L can come apart. 
They can come apart because an agent might have false beliefs, and these false beliefs 
will inform what the agent can will. 
 Now what I am saying about FUL should not be misunderstood. The idea is not that 
an agent who convinces him/herself that s/he can will X as a universal law eo ipso facto 
can. Similarly, the idea is not that there is no fact of the matter with regard to whether an 
agent can will X as a universal law. There is a fact of the matter about whether an agent 
can will X as a universal law. The point is that this fact is not independent of the agent’s 
beliefs about how the world works, where these might include things like beliefs about 
purposiveness, (folk) psychology, etc.  
 In sum: what one can will is based on what one believes about the world. An agent 
can will to do something that is logically impossible if s/he does not believe it to be so 
(consider Hobbes, who willed to square a circle). Similarly, what can become a universal 
law through one’s will is based on what one believes about the world. If one’s beliefs are 
false, then one might wind up adopting maxims that pass FUL but not L.ix Simply 
looking at an agent’s maxim (and the circumstances in which the agent is situated) do not 
give enough information to get a result from FUL. Knowledge of the agent’s beliefs must 
be taken into account in determining what can become a universal law through the 
agent’s will.x  
 1.2 FH: Existing or expressing  
 
 In his derivation of FH in part II of the Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant articulates two principles.xi The first is:  
 
H: Rational nature exists as an end in itself.xii 
 
The second is:  
 
FH: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or the 
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a 
means.xiii  
 
The difference between H and FH is similar to the gap between L and FUL.xiv H is an 
existence claim. H is a claim about things out there in the world and the value that they 
have. FH has to do with expressive reasons for acting.xv But one’s expressive reasons for 
acting depend on one’s beliefs about the world. If these beliefs are incorrect, then what 
one does might be in conformity with FH but not with H.xvi  
 An analogy will make this clear. Suppose I am talking with a friend. What I say 
will depend to some extent on what I believe about the meaning of words. When I misuse 
one particular word and my beliefs about the meaning of that word are readily 
identifiable, we can distinguish between what I (actually) said and what I intended to say. 
Similarly, FH latches on to expressive reasons for acting, thus it latches on to what I 
intend to express with my actions. H latches on to what I actually express with my 
actions. Although these two things (what I intend to express and what I actually express) 
usually cohere and inform one another in complex ways, there are cases in which they 
clearly come apart as a result of false beliefs.  
 Consider the action of engaging in sex apart from procreation. If I believe that the 
inclination to sex is an animal impulse and that its purpose is procreation, then upon 
reflection I shall come to believe that this action is immoral. The ground of proof for this 
would be that this kind of sex would constitute a surrendering of my personality. This 
kind of sex would be making use of my humanity as an instrument for the satisfaction of 
my animal lusts and desires.xvii But if I believe that the inclination to sex is inextricably 
bound up with my humanity and if I think its purpose is to maintain the hormonal balance 
required for physical and mental health, then in engaging in sex apart from procreation I 
would not be using my humanity as a mere instrument for the satisfaction of my animal 
lusts and desires. Rather, I would be trying to further my humanity as an end. My action 
would be expressive of the desire to harmonize with humanity as an end. 
 Because FH deals with what one is expressing in one’s actions, whether one is 
acting in accordance with it will depend to some extent on one’s beliefs. However, H is 
not relativized in this way. H contains no reference to acting or using, thus the fact that 
what an agent is expressing depends in part on the agent’s beliefs does not come into 
play. Regardless of what the agent believes about the purposiveness of the inclination to 
sex, there is a fact of the matter: humanity exists as an end in itself. If an agent 
unintentionally infringes on his/her own rights or the rights of another, s/he has infringed 
on someone’s rights regardless of whether his/her action is classified as innocent or 
morally reprehensible. The act itself constitutes the violation of H. But the violation of 
FH (if there was one) might be located elsewhere.  
 I bring up the discussion of rights because a distinction similar to the one I am 
drawing between H and FH can be seen in Kant’s Rechtslehre. In the Rechtslehre, Kant 
distinguishes between positive laws (laws that are, as a matter of fact, in place) and 
natural laws (laws that should be in place). An example to bring out this distinction is as 
follows. For many years, it was written into the US constitution that blacks count as only 
0.6 of a person for the purposes of representation in congress.xviii This (among others) 
was a positive law that most people now recognize violated natural law. Someone who 
wanted to emphasize the legal analog of H or L would say that someone following the 
positive law is acting in a way that is legally culpable because the law is not a good one. 
Someone who wanted to emphasize the legal analog of FH or FUL would say that 
someone following the positive law is acting in a way that is not legally culpable, but 
would point out that this is an unfortunate result of a more fundamental error, viz., a bad 
positive law. 
 The point is that what one expresses in one’s actions is based on one’s conception 
of the world. An agent can write a paper or a paragraph that winds up being total 
gibberish if s/he consistently but unintentionally misuses a word or phrase. The agent 
might have had a clear idea in mind; s/he might be able to articulate it very well once 
informed of the malapropism; one even might be able to figure out what s/he is trying to 
say from the context. But the meaning of the words s/he used and what s/he intended to 
express come apart. Similarly, whether one expresses respect for humanity or treats it as 
an end is based on what one believes about the world. If one’s beliefs are false, then one 
might wind up performing actions that are in conformity with FH but not with H. 
 
  
2 Bridging the gap: from intrinsic legality to intrinsic 
normativity and back  
 
 In the previous section I argued for a distinction between L and H on the one hand 
and FUL and FH on the other. This distinction is referred to by some commentators as 
the distinction between intrinsic legality and intrinsic normativity.xix But Kant does not 
recognize any distinction between L and H on the one hand and FUL and FH on the 
other. Thus, in this section I shall canvass three distinct ways of bridging the gaps 
between L and FUL and between H and FH. I shall give all three of them a Kantian 
pedigree. However, my goal is simply to show that there are these three positions. I do 
not want to argue that one is better than the other or that Kant recognized this problem 
clearly and distinctly and took an unambiguous position on it.  
 
2.1 Denying the problem of moral knowledge: intuiting moral 
properties  
 
 One way to bridge the gaps between L and FUL and H and FH is to deny the 
problem of moral knowledge. If one can intuit directly whether a maxim passes L or 
whether an action is in accordance with H, then no issue of false beliefs can arise. No 
issue of false beliefs can arise because one clearly and distinctly perceives whether a 
given maxim conforms to L or a given action conforms to H. Since one knows this 
directly, there can be no false beliefs that result in maxims that pass FUL but not L or 
actions that pass FH but not H. Thus, the gaps described in the previous section 
disappear.  
 There is evidence that Kant subscribes to a position like this. For example, in the 
Critique of Practical Reason Kant writes:  
 
The most common understanding can distinguish without instruction what form in a maxim 
makes it fit for a giving of universal law and what does not. (KpV, AA 05:27)  
 
And just a few pages later, Kant makes the following, similar claim:  
 
What is required in accordance with the principle of autonomy of choice is easily and without 
hesitation seen by the commonest intelligence… That is to say, what duty is, is plain of itself 
to everyone… (KpV, AA 05:38)  
 
These two passages indicate that Kant thinks that moral knowledge is unreflective 
(known “without hesitation”), universal (known by the “commonest intelligence,” the 
“most common intelligence” and “everyone”) and not acquired with difficulty (known 
“easily,” for it is “plain of itself ”).  
 Hints of this view are also prominent in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of 
Morals. In part I of the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that if an 
action is from duty, it eo ipso facto is in conformity with duty (GMS, AA 04:390).xx The 
idea behind this conditional seems to be the following: (1) if an agent is acting from duty, 
s/he must believe that the action is a duty and (2) if some action is a duty, then it is in 
conformity with duty. But this line of reasoning gets us to the desired conclusion (that if 
an action is from duty, it eo ipso facto is in conformity with duty) only if Kant also is 
assuming that agents cannot be incorrect in believing that an action is a duty. That is, this 
line of reasoning goes through only if one denies the problem of moral knowledge, for if 
an agent can be incorrect in believing that an action is a duty, then it is not the case that if 
an agent believes that some action is a duty, then that action is a duty.  
 In other words, unless one denies the problem of moral knowledge, it could be the 
case that some agent believes that some action is a duty even though that action is 
contrary to duty. But such an agent could act from duty even though the agent’s action 
might not be in conformity with duty. Thus, unless one denies the problem of moral 
knowledge, the claim at GMS, AA 04:390 breaks down.  
 The point is not that it is implausible to argue that if an action is from duty, it eo 
ipso facto is in conformity with duty. The point is that Kant’s claim at GMS, AA 04:390 
reveals something. In particular, it reveals that Kant seems to be committed to a denial of 
the problem of moral knowledge. Just as the passages from the Critique of Practical 
Reason indicate, Kant, at times, seems to be committed to the idea that agents have an 
infallible and immediate grasp of moral truths. Whatever the philosophical repercussions 
of such a view might be, it hopefully is clear that there is evidence that Kant was tempted 
by it. And hopefully it also is clear that it would bridge the gap between L and H on the 
one hand and FUL and FH on the other.  
 
2.2 Denying the relevance of legality: conscience as the inner judge  
 
 Another way to bridge the gaps between L and FUL and H and FH is to argue that, 
in ethics, one is one’s own judge. If one has acted in accordance with one’s own moral 
principles, then, for the purposes of ethics, one has done all that one ought. The issue of 
false beliefs becomes irrelevant because insofar as one makes L or H the principle of 
one’s will, one is guiltless, regardless of whether one’s (subordinate) maxims really could 
be universal laws or really are in accordance with the existence of rational nature as an 
end in itself. If one tries to conform one’s maxims to universal laws or if one tries to act 
in accordance with the existence of rational nature as an end in itself, that is enough for 
the purposes of ethics. (It might not be enough for right, but that is a different story.)  
 There is evidence that Kant subscribes to a position like this. Kant makes the 
following claim in the second half of the Metaphysics of Morals:  
 
But if someone is aware that he has acted in accordance with his conscience, then as far as 
guilt or innocence is concerned nothing more can be required of him. (TL, AA 06:401)xxi 
 
A thorough discussion of Kant’s notion of conscience would be too difficult to undertake 
here. But in order to understand the relevance of Kant’s claim at TL, AA 06:401, one 
must know what roles Kant takes conscience to fulfill. Kant thinks that conscience acts as 
one’s inner judge in determining whether one has behaved morally.xxii As such, 
conscience has two roles. An agent’s conscience judges whether s/he has fulfilled his/her 
first-order duties. In addition, an agent’s conscience judges whether s/he has exercised 
due care in determining whether a certain action is permissible (i.e., whether the agent 
has been negligent).xxiii In other words, conscience judges (1) whether an agent has done 
what s/he ought and (2) whether an agent has exercised due care in figuring out what s/he 
ought to do.  
 Now the whole point of discussing an agent who adopts a bad principle as a result 
of (not despite) a failure in judgment or a false belief is that such an agent seems to be 
acting in accordance with conscience. There is no inner judge that could condemn such 
an agent at the time of acting; indeed, the inner judge approves of the action. The agent 
(ex hypothesi) meets the internal conditions of good willing. The quotation from TL, AA 
06:401 suggests that Kant held the view that such agents are inculpable.  
 Someone might object that the quotation at TL, AA 06:401 does not suggest this at 
all. The idea behind such an objection might be as follows. Strictly speaking, the idea that 
acting in accordance with conscience is sufficient for moral guiltlessness is consistent 
with (and perhaps bolstered by) holding that error about whether, for example, a maxim 
is universalizable is impossible without systematic self-deception. The objector might go 
on to point out that, indeed, in the very passage in which Kant claims that acting in 
accordance with conscience is a sufficient condition for moral guiltlessness, Kant claims 
that conscience cannot err.  
 However, this objection does not withstand a close scrutiny of the text. The 
argument for the claim that conscience cannot err is as follows:  
 
…while I can indeed be mistaken at times in my objective judgment as to whether something 
is a duty or not, I cannot be mistaken in my subjective judgment as to whether I have 
submitted it to practical reason (here in its role as judge) for such a judgment; for if I could be 
mistaken in that, I would have made no practical judgment at all, and in that case there would 
be neither truth nor error. (TL, AA 06:401)xxiv  
 
There are two things of note about this argument for the claim that conscience cannot err. 
First, the argument for the claim that conscience cannot err does not establish that 
conscience cannot err either in its role in assessing whether an agent has fulfilled first 
order duties or in its role in assessing whether an agent has exerted due diligence in 
determining whether a given action is permissible. Rather, the argument is intended to 
establish that “I cannot be mistaken in my subjective judgment as to whether I have 
submitted it [i.e., the action] to practical reason (here in its role as judge) for such a 
judgment.” This is analogous to the role of the bell on a microwave. I shall call this the 
check function. Conscience, in this capacity, tells an agent whether s/he has submitted an 
action that s/he is considering to the principles that s/he holds. The check function gives a 
yes or no answer. The check function does not tell an agent whether the action is in 
accordance (or not in accordance) with the agent’s moral principles. Thus, it does not tell 
an agent whether s/he has performed his/her first order duties. The check function tells an 
agent whether s/he has asked the question, “Have I performed my first order duties?” The 
check function does not tell an agent what the answer to this question is. Thus, the check 
function is not equivalent to the function conscience fulfills in telling an agent whether 
s/he has fulfilled his/her first order duties.xxv Similarly, the check function is not 
equivalent to figuring out whether an agent has exerted due diligence in determining 
whether a given action is permissible. It is only once the check function gives a positive 
answer that one is in a position to ask whether one has engaged in due diligence.  
 Second, Kant admits explicitly in this passage that “I can indeed be mistaken at 
times in my objective judgment as to whether something is a duty or not.”xxvi Given that 
he admits this in the same passage in which he claims that acting in accordance with 
conscience is a sufficient condition for moral guiltlessness, it seems to me to be 
reasonable to conclude that some parts of Kant’s corpus suggest (1) that agents can make 
mistakes about whether a maxim conforms to universal law or whether an action 
conforms to the existence of rational nature as an end in itselfxxvii and (2) agents who 
make such mistakes are guiltless in their adoption of such maxims or performance of 
such actions.xxviii 
 
2.3 A middle ground: distinguishing between natural and acquired 
obligations  
 
Arguing that agents never can be incorrect about their obligations because they have an 
immediate intuition of the moral properties of their maxims and actions is an extreme 
position. Arguing that agents can be incorrect about their obligations but that this is 
inconsequential (for moral purposes) so long as they act in accordance with their 
consciences (in accordance with what they take their obligations to be) is also an extreme 
position. However, there is an intermediate position suggested by some passages in 
Kant’s lectures on ethics.  
 At V-Mo/Collins, AA 27:355 Kant argues:  
 
In regard to his natural obligations, nobody can be in error; for the natural moral laws cannot 
be unknown to anyone, in that they lie in reason for all; hence nobody is guiltless there in 
such error. (V-Mo/Collins, AA 27:355)  
 
In this passage Kant suggests that there are some cases (“natural obligations”) in which 
there is no problem of moral knowledge. In these cases, no gap can open up between L 
and FUL or H and FH. But in a similar passage Kant claims that distinguishing between 
natural obligations and acquired obligations (non-natural obligations) is notoriously 
difficult (V-Mo/Herder, AA 27:42-43).xxix There are two implications of Kant’s 
discussion: (1) An agent can be guiltless in an error about acquired obligations and (2) it 
is very difficult to distinguish between natural obligations and acquired obligations.xxx (1) 
indicates that there are some cases (acquired obligations) in which there is a gap between 
L and FUL and H and FH. (2) suggests that even in cases of natural obligations, this gap 
might seem to open up. The gap might seem to open up because it is very difficult to 
distinguish between natural obligations and acquired obligations.  
 The distinction between natural and acquired obligations must be taken as a starting 
point. The distinction might be vague at the borders, but that does not prevent one from 
giving examples of what Kant probably would have thought fell under these headings. An 
example of an infringement of an acquired obligation would be a person who chews with 
his/her mouth open in a restaurant. An example of an infringement of a natural obligation 
would be the actions of Himmler and his S.S. officers. Indeed, Himmler himself seems 
dimly aware of the fact that he and his officers were infringing on a natural obligation. In 
a speech made to S. S. officers he is reported to have said the following:  
 
…I also want to talk to you quite frankly on a very grave matter… I mean… the 
extermination of the Jewish race… Most of you must know what it means when 100 corpses 
are lying side by side, or 500, or 1,000. To have stuck it out and at the same time — apart 
from exceptions caused by human weakness — to have remained decent fellows, that is what 
has made us hard.xxxi  
 
Himmler boasted that the S. S. had succeeding in wiping out the Jews  
 
…without our leaders and their men suffering any damage in their minds and souls. The  
danger was considerable, for there was only a narrow path between the Scylla of their 
becoming heartless ruffians unable any longer to treasure life, and the Charybdis of their 
becoming soft and suffering nervous breakdowns.xxxii  
 
This, I submit, is the talk of somebody who knows that what he is doing is wrong. He 
admits the difficulty in remaining “decent fellows” in the face of 100, 500 or 1,000 
corpses lying side by side. The S. S. officers had to steer a path between becoming 
“heartless ruffians” on the one side and suffering “nervous breakdowns” on the other. 
One simple explanation for this is that they were going against the grain and they knew it.  
 Of course, Himmler would not be happy with this explanation. Himmler would say 
that he is forced (by moral compulsion) to carry out a disagreeable duty. Natural 
sympathy might make it pain a judge that he must condemn a guilty man; a physician 
might abhor the sight of blood when he must cut a patient in surgery to save his life. The 
fact that they feel this ambivalence, which could be characterized as a conflict between 
“hard” duty and a bad tendency to be “soft,” does not show that they are doing wrong in 
performing their duties as a judge or surgeon. Himmler would try to rationalize his 
conflicts by comparing them to cases like this.  
 The point of the discussion, however, is not to take a stand on whether there are 
natural obligations.xxxiii The point is that if there are natural obligations, then Himmler, 
surely, is someone who infringed upon them; the thin layer of self-deception present in 
his speeches and memoirs seems to provide evidence for this. But I do not need (and am 
not going to try) to give some sort of apodictic proof that Himmler was aware that what 
he was doing was wrong. The point is that if there are such things as natural obligations, 
then surely Himmler is someone who infringed upon them.  
 The distinction between natural and acquired obligations would bridge the gaps 
between H and FH and L and FUL in different ways in different cases. In the case of 
natural obligations, the gaps would not open up because (ex hypothesi) agents cannot be 
incorrect inculpably about such obligations. Agents could not be incorrect inculpably 
about whether maxims associated with natural obligations are universalizable or whether 
actions associated with natural obligations are in conformity with the existence of 
humanity as an end in itself. However, in cases of acquired obligations, agents can be 
mistaken about these things. And the implication of the passages from Kant’s lectures is 
that in such cases, agents might be guiltless. Thus, in cases of acquired obligation in 
which agents are mistaken about the properties of their maxims or their actions and thus 
are acting in conformity with FUL or FH but not with L or H, the agents are acting 
inculpably.xxxiv  
 This position incorporates aspects of both of the positions articulated in the 
previous two subsections. Perhaps somebody more ambitious than I could massage the 
texts in such a way as to show that Kant has one clear and coherent position. (If so, 
Kant’s position most likely would take the distinction between natural and acquired 
obligations as a starting point as suggested in this subsection. The quotations from the 
first subsection would be taken to be overstatements of Kant’s position in one direction; 
agents do not always know immediately whether their maxims are universalizable. The 
quotations from the second subsection would be taken to be overstatements of Kant’s 
position in the other direction; agents can make nonculpable mistakes about their 
obligations only in the case of acquired obligations.) But my goal has been merely to 
articulate the different options and to show how they interrelate.  
 3 Conclusion  
 
In this paper I argued that there is a gap between L and H on the one hand and FUL and 
FH on the other. This gap arises because what one wills and what one expresses are 
dependent upon one’s beliefs, and one’s beliefs might be false. I argued that this gap can 
be closed in one of three ways. First, someone could deny the problem of moral 
knowledge: someone could argue that agents have a direct, clear, distinct and intuitive 
knowledge of the moral properties of maxims and actions. Second, someone could argue 
that if one is acting in accordance with one’s moral principles as one accepts them, then 
one is guiltless as far as morality is concerned. Thus, if one makes L or H the principle of 
one’s will, then one has done all that one ought, false beliefs and bad actions 
notwithstanding. It might be an intrinsic feature of maxims that they have lawlike form or 
that they are in conformity with humanity as an end in itself. But to determine whether an 
agent is acting in accordance with the Categorical Imperative is a difficult question, and 
figuring out the intrinsic properties of an agent’s maxim or action does not exhaust it. 
Third, someone might make a distinction between natural and acquired obligations and 
argue that, in the case of the former, agents cannot be mistaken inculpably whereas in the 
case of the latter, agents can. If one accepts any but the first option, then the standard 
reading of Kant’s as an ethics of willing, an ethics of maxims, an ethics of intention is in 
need of some serious revision.  
 Before I conclude, I shall say something about the distinction between right and 
good on Kant’s theory. According to Kant’s theory of right, the privileged perspective is 
not that of the agent but that of the judge who is taken to be a representative of the 
general will. A judge in a court of law might decide whether an infringement of right has 
occurred by appealing to an agent’s intents, beliefs and maxims more broadly. 
 Thus, regardless of which position one accepts (i.e., regardless of whether one 
denies the problem of moral knowledge or not), according to a Kantian theory of right 
agents can be punished rightfully and can be judged legally culpable for doing things 
regardless of their intentions. If one does deny the problem of moral knowledge, then a 
certain view of the interconnection between right and good can arise (viz., a monist view 
according to which legal culpability implies moral culpability). If one does not deny the 
problem of moral knowledge, then another view can arise (viz., a dualist view according 
to which legal culpability does not imply moral culpability). But the questions that this 
raises are far beyond the scope of this paper.   
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